Last weekend a friend clued me onto an interesting football discussion he found on the internet. Someone had made the bold claim that a team down 14 points late in the 4th quarter is better off attempting a 2-point conversion after it scores a touchdown (thus putting them down 8 point before the conversion) rather than kicking the extra point.
Conventional wisdom suggests you kick the extra point, which puts you down 7 points and in position to score another touchdown and extra point to tie the game and send it to overtime. 2-point conversions, of course, are far less successful, and failing on the first attempt would put you down 8 points, meaning your team would be forced to convert a second 2-point conversion attempt just to tie the game and send it to overtime.
But the numbers don't lie: going for 2 clearly makes more sense.
Two important things to keep in mind: (1) Getting to overtime, which is the coach's only chance at winning when he kicks the extra points, means you'll only win (roughly) 50% of the time. (2) If you successfully convert a 2-point attempt after the first touchdown, you don't need to go for two again. You're only down 6 points, which means a touchdown and extra point wins the game outright.
Back to point (1): given that extra points are sometimes missed (approx. 2% of the time), this means the conservative coach's overall chance of winning is below 50%. (98% x 98% = 96.04%, the chances of making both extra points. Multiply by 50% to see how often you win in overtime and you get 48.02%. (There are other less likely outcomes, such as missing the first extra point then successfully earning a two-point conversion, or making the first extra point then missing the second, which put the overall chance of winning at 48.44%.)
But the aggressive coach will actually win more than half the time. The success rate of 2-point conversions has fluctuated between 40 and 50% since the NFL began allowing them in 1994. Let's use 42%. Going for 2 after the touchdown(s) means you'll win without overtime 41.16% (42% x 98%) of the time and lose before overtime 33.64% (58% x 58%) of the time. The remaining ~25% of the time, you'll go to overtime and win half, for an overall chance of winning at roughly 53.76%.
So, what's interesting about this? If you know anything about football, you know this argument flies in the face of pretty much every coach's strategy, which is almost always incredibly conservative.
But I was reading about this last Saturday night, right after the NFL Pro Bowl. As I read the synopsis of the game, I realized this exact situation had occurred. The NFC was down 28-14 with 3 minutes left in the game. It scored a quick touchdown and tried a 2-point conversion (and failed). It got the ball back and scored again, this time earning the 2 points and tying the game at 28. The NFC's coach, Sean Payton, had defied all conventional wisdom and tried out the strategy. He had succeeded in tying the game while also (if they had converted the first 2-point attempt) giving his team a shot to win outright.
In the end, however, Payton's team made one mistake-- they scored too quickly. There was enough time left on the clock for the AFC team to march down the field and kick a game-winning field goal as time expired. The AFC won 31-28.
Conventional wisdom suggests you kick the extra point, which puts you down 7 points and in position to score another touchdown and extra point to tie the game and send it to overtime. 2-point conversions, of course, are far less successful, and failing on the first attempt would put you down 8 points, meaning your team would be forced to convert a second 2-point conversion attempt just to tie the game and send it to overtime.
But the numbers don't lie: going for 2 clearly makes more sense.
Two important things to keep in mind: (1) Getting to overtime, which is the coach's only chance at winning when he kicks the extra points, means you'll only win (roughly) 50% of the time. (2) If you successfully convert a 2-point attempt after the first touchdown, you don't need to go for two again. You're only down 6 points, which means a touchdown and extra point wins the game outright.
Back to point (1): given that extra points are sometimes missed (approx. 2% of the time), this means the conservative coach's overall chance of winning is below 50%. (98% x 98% = 96.04%, the chances of making both extra points. Multiply by 50% to see how often you win in overtime and you get 48.02%. (There are other less likely outcomes, such as missing the first extra point then successfully earning a two-point conversion, or making the first extra point then missing the second, which put the overall chance of winning at 48.44%.)
But the aggressive coach will actually win more than half the time. The success rate of 2-point conversions has fluctuated between 40 and 50% since the NFL began allowing them in 1994. Let's use 42%. Going for 2 after the touchdown(s) means you'll win without overtime 41.16% (42% x 98%) of the time and lose before overtime 33.64% (58% x 58%) of the time. The remaining ~25% of the time, you'll go to overtime and win half, for an overall chance of winning at roughly 53.76%.
So, what's interesting about this? If you know anything about football, you know this argument flies in the face of pretty much every coach's strategy, which is almost always incredibly conservative.
But I was reading about this last Saturday night, right after the NFL Pro Bowl. As I read the synopsis of the game, I realized this exact situation had occurred. The NFC was down 28-14 with 3 minutes left in the game. It scored a quick touchdown and tried a 2-point conversion (and failed). It got the ball back and scored again, this time earning the 2 points and tying the game at 28. The NFC's coach, Sean Payton, had defied all conventional wisdom and tried out the strategy. He had succeeded in tying the game while also (if they had converted the first 2-point attempt) giving his team a shot to win outright.
In the end, however, Payton's team made one mistake-- they scored too quickly. There was enough time left on the clock for the AFC team to march down the field and kick a game-winning field goal as time expired. The AFC won 31-28.
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I think what we learn from Marty Shottenheimer is that winning a lot of games in the long run doesn't guarantee you anything. Just be like Norv Turner, and lose with dignity, and you'll always have a head coaching job waiting for you. Marty might have been better off playing Marty-ball, losing a few games, keeping his assistants, and keeping his job.
ReplyDelete...and I voted for Scorcese - I think Babel and Eastwood will rain down the bullshit from both sides.